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II.-322 
PAVING THE WAY FOR RECOGNIZING 
POSTPENETRATION RAPE THROUGH  
THE MISTAKE OF FACT DEFENSE 
Abstract: On February 13, 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
Commonwealth v. Sherman introduced a communication element in rape cases 
involving withdrawn consent. The prosecutor must prove that the victim commu-
nicated the revocation of consent such that a reasonable defendant would under-
stand its withdrawal. In doing so, the court invoked a mistake of fact defense 
with regard to consent, which Massachusetts historically did not apply in its rape 
jurisprudence. This Comment notes that Massachusetts is unique in recognizing 
postpenetration rape as a legal possibility. This Comment compares Sherman to 
the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in 2008 in Commonwealth v. Blache. In 
Blache, the court made the mistake of fact defense available to the defendant 
when the victim was incapacitated and thus could not consent. By comparing 
Sherman to Blache, this Comment further argues that the mistake of fact defense 
in cases of postpenetration rape does not expand Massachusetts’ principle that the 
mistake of fact defense should not apply in most rape cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rape cases are notoriously murky and embroiled with emotion.1 They be-
come even murkier in cases of postpenetration rape, which present fact pat-
terns in which a purported victim initially consented to sexual activity but re-
                                                                                                                           
 Thank you to Professor R. Michael Cassidy at Boston College Law School for his guidance 
throughout the writing of this Comment. 
 1 See Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: “No” Means “No,” but What Does 
“Yes” Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341, 2341 (2004) [hereinafter “What Does “Yes” Mean?”] (ex-
plaining how issues of consent are especially confusing in cases of revoked consent); Max Ehren-
freund, The Scientific Research Shows Reports of Rape Are Often Murky, but Rarely False, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/11/the-scientific-
research-shows-reports-of-rape-are-often-murky-but-rarely-false/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/
XK2R-ERQX] (remarking on the factual inconsistencies of an infamous rape case and exploring how 
the trauma of rape can affect memory); Vivian Wang, Yale Rape Verdict Shows How ‘Yes Means Yes’ 
Can Be Murkier in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/nyregion/
yale-rape-verdict-consent-not-guilty-jurors.html [https://perma.cc/DXM6-4YUX] (noting the gap in 
discourse about rape on college campuses as compared to in courtrooms can lead to different under-
standing of facts). Massachusetts defines rape as sexual intercourse by means of force and without the 
victim’s consent. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001); see infra notes 16–19 
and accompanying text. Although postpenetration rape can also be written as post-penetration rape, 
this Comment will refer to postpenetration without the hyphen to align with the way the Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) of Massachusetts wrote it in Commonwealth v. Sherman. 116 N.E.3d 597, 605 
(Mass. 2019); see also infra note 13 (explaining the nomenclature for a person subject to rape as vic-
tim versus survivor). 
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voked consent after penetration.2 Since 1979, when North Carolina addressed 
the first postpenetration rape case, fewer than ten states have recognized post-
penetration rape despite increasing emphasis on the victim’s consent or lack 
thereof.3 In 2019, in Commonwealth v. Sherman, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) cemented Massachusetts within the minority of jurisdic-
tions that explicitly recognize victims’ ability to withdraw consent and seek 
criminal prosecution if the defendant does not cease upon such withdrawal.4 
Seeking to delineate when consensual sex transforms into postpenetration rape, 
the SJC in Sherman imposed a requirement for the prosecution to prove that 
the victim communicate the withdrawal of consent such that a reasonable per-
son would know continued intercourse would be nonconsensual.5 This element 
invoked the mistake of fact defense6 regarding consent in rape cases, which 
Massachusetts previously did not allow except for in cases where the victim 
was incapable of consenting.7 The SJC made the mistake of fact defense avail-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Amanda O. Davis, Comment, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The Evolution of Post-
Penetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729, 732 (2005) (explaining how testimonies from the 
victim and defendant tend to diverge in cases of withdrawn consent); Tiffany Bohn, Comment, Yes, 
Then No, Means No: Current Issues, Trends, and Problems in Post-Penetration Rape, 25 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 151, 164 (2004) (citing juror confusion about consent as the reason state legislatures should 
define postpenetration rape). 
 3 Sarah O. Parker, No Means No . . . Sometimes; Developments in Postpenetration Rape Law and 
the Need for Legislative Action, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1067, 1068 n.13 (2013); see Davis, supra note 2, 
at 744 n.125 (citing Alaska, California, Connecticut, Maine, and Kansas as states that had explicitly 
addressed postpenetration rape). Prior to rape law reform beginning in the 1970s, courts required the 
victim to exercise the utmost resistance, resisting until “her dying breath,” during the sexual encounter 
to establish a rape occurred. Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 205, 212 
(2017). By separating the elements of force and non-consent, victims who surrendered were not con-
sidered raped unless deadly abuse occurred. Id. Feminist criticism of these dynamics gave rise to re-
form efforts, including the elimination of the force requirement in some jurisdictions. Id. at 213; see 
infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (defining rape). 
 4 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605. 
 5 Id. at 606. Postpenetration rape occurs when the parties consent to sex initially, but during the 
intercourse one of the parties withdraws consent, yet the other party forces the continuation of sex 
against the revoking party’s will. Davis, supra note 2, at 729–30; see infra note 16 (defining consent). 
 6 Mistake-of-Fact Defense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The mistake of fact 
defense allows the defendant to claim that an error of fact nullifies the intent required for a guilty 
verdict. Id. 
 7 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605. In Sherman, the SJC considered the trial judge’s response to a 
question submitted by the jury regarding whether sex constitutes rape if it began consensually and 
then the victim revoked consent. Id. at 603. This evaluation led the SJC to hold that the prosecution 
must prove “that the victim reasonably communicate[d] to the defendant his or her withdrawal of 
consent” as an element in postpenetration rape. Id. at 605. The mistake of fact defense accompanied 
this additional burden of proof because the jury must enter into the state of mind of a reasonable de-
fendant to determine whether “a reasonable person would have known that consent had been with-
drawn.” Id. at 606. Prior to Sherman, the mistake of fact defense was only available to defendants in 
cases of rape where the victim did not have the capacity to consent. Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 
N.E.2d 736, 744 (Mass. 2008). In 2008, in Commonwealth v. Blache, the SJC explained that the pros-
ecution must prove that the defendant knew of the victim’s incapacity and consequently afforded the 
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able to defendants in cases where the victim is incapable of consenting in 2008 
in Commonwealth v. Blache.8 The narrow circumstances in which the mistake 
of fact defense applies combined with the SJC’s recognition of postpenetration 
rape in Massachusetts aligns with reformers’ calls for greater emphasis on con-
sent.9 
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the elements the prosecution 
must prove to establish rape in Massachusetts and proceeds to highlight the 
facts in Sherman.10 Part II examines and discusses Massachusetts’ rape juris-
prudence compared to other states.11 Finally, Part III argues that the similarity 
between Sherman and Blache shows that the invocation of the mistake of fact 
defense in Sherman does not diminish the defense’s narrow application in 
Massachusetts’ rape jurisprudence.12 
I. THE ELEMENTS OF RAPE AND THE MISTAKE OF FACT  
DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
In 2019, the SJC’s decision in Commonwealth v. Sherman reflected en-
during emphasis on the nuances of consent in the evolution of rape law.13 Sec-
                                                                                                                           
defendant the opportunity to argue that he made a reasonable mistake as to the victim’s consent as a 
defense. Id. 
 8 Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 744. 
 9 See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for 
Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 1030 (2008) (showing that reformers seek to diminish 
the incidences of rape by facilitating conviction of individuals guilty of rape and easing the victim’s 
full participation in subsequent court proceedings); see also Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the 
War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 608 (2009) (advocating for the law to reflect women’s capabil-
ity of expressing their desires and choices); Dana Vetterhoffer, Comment, No Means No: Weakening 
Sexism in Rape Law by Legitimizing Post-Penetration Rape, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1229, 1231 (2005) 
(calling for reform in postpenetration rape jurisprudence because it constitutes a “catch-all for sexism 
in the world of rape”). 
 10 See infra notes 13–62 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 63–93 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 94–114 and accompanying text. 
 13 See generally Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (recognizing the right to withdraw consent during a 
sexual encounter and requiring the state to prove that the victim communicated withdrawn consent). 
Although various legal terms may describe unlawful sexual contact, this Comment will use “rape.” See 
Key Terms and Phrases, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-
terms-and-phrases [https://perma.cc/UX6A-XQM7] (articulating various terms for unlawful sexual 
contact). This Comment will identify the individual alleging rape as the “victim” to align with the 
courts’ nomenclature; however, it is worth noting that it is also appropriate to call someone who has 
experienced sexual violence a “survivor” instead. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 599; Key Terms & Phrases, 
supra. 
 Capturing the nuances of consent is important for sexual autonomy. See Corey Rayburn Yung, 
Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 5 (2015) (explaining how an emphasis on 
sexual autonomy elevates the importance of consent); Amanda Foreman, The Struggle Before #Me-
Too, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-struggle-before-metoo-
1535038174 [https://perma.cc/D7AM-ZAUM] (noting that the message of the #MeToo digital social 
movement is that women encounter too many barriers when seeking justice after a sexual assault). 
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tion A of this Part discusses the elements required to establish rape in Massa-
chusetts and how the withdrawal of consent during intercourse fits into those 
elements.14 Section B of this Part examines the factual and procedural history 
of Sherman and details its creation of a communication element.15 
A. The Elements of Rape and Withdrawal of Consent During Intercourse 
Massachusetts has long defined rape as sexual intercourse by means of 
force and without the victim’s consent.16 Breaking this definition into ele-
ments, the prosecution must prove: (1) sex, (2) force or threat of force, and (3) 
lack of consent.17 Massachusetts defines force broadly, including both physical 
force and nonphysical constructive force, such as fear and threats of physical 
harm.18 When the victim does not have the capacity to consent, the force nec-
essary for penetration is sufficient to satisfy the force element.19 
The consent element inquiry evaluates consent in fact—not whether the 
perpetrator understood consent.20 The determination of consent in fact only 
asks whether the victim was willing to engage in sexual intercourse.21 By re-
moving subjectivity of what the defendant understood from the consent ele-
ment, Massachusetts ensured that a victim does not need to resist with force to 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 16–36 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 37–62 and accompanying text. 
 16 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (2017); Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 965 (“[P]rove beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant committed (1) sexual intercourse (2) by force or threat of force and 
against the will of the victim.”); see also Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 603 (citing Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 
965, to define the elements the prosecution must satisfy). Massachusetts describes the sex element of 
rape to include sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22. 
Intercourse tends to include penetration. See infra note 19 (defining penetration). Consent means the 
voluntary acceptance or agreement to what another suggests or wants. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 6. 
 17 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 965; see also Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 603–04 (explaining the elements of 
rape). 
 18 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 965; see also Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 603–04 (defining force inclusive-
ly). 
 19 Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 740 (noting that the prosecution must only prove the amount of force 
required for penetration). In Massachusetts, penetration means the insertion, no matter the extent, of 
any object or body part into any bodily orifice. Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 966 N.E.2d 840, 843 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012); Massachusetts Rape Laws, FINDLAW (June 20, 2016), https://statelaws.find
law.com/massachusetts-law/massachusetts-rape-laws.html [https://perma.cc/3CHU-UFSH]. 
 20 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 965. The Court also emphasized that not requiring the prosecution to 
prove knowledge with regard to the consent element does not make rape a strict liability crime. See id. 
at 966 (noting that in Massachusetts, rape requires general intent). The term perpetrator is a moniker 
for a person who acts illegally or commits a crime. Perpetrator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 6. 
 21 See Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 377 (1870) (demonstrating Massachusetts’ 
longstanding commitment to evaluating consent factually rather than relying on the defendant’s sub-
jective understanding). 
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communicate unwillingness to consent.22 The factual nature of the consent in-
quiry minimizes the availability of a mistake of fact defense to defendants in 
most rape scenarios.23 
The mistake of fact defense allows the defendant to argue that he or she 
made a reasonable mistake in thinking that the victim had consented.24 In the 
context of rape cases, the SJC made the mistake of fact defense available to 
defendants for the first time in 2008 in Commonwealth v. Blache.25 The court 
explained that the defendant’s subjective knowledge is only relevant in cases 
where the victim did not have the capacity to consent.26 This interpretation of 
consent falls within the minority of jurisdictions.27 Such an emphasis on the 
victim’s state of mind without inquiry into the defendant’s puts Massachusetts 
at the forefront of implementing reform efforts.28 Many of these reform efforts 
aim to remove obstacles for victims seeking justice for their sexual trauma.29 
Although it emphasized the limited application of the mistake of fact de-
fense in Massachusetts’ rape jurisprudence, the SJC in 2001 in Lopez left open 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 967; see also Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Mass. 
1982) (asserting that “any resistance is enough” to convey lack of consent). When relying on a con-
sent in fact analysis, the extent of the victim’s resistance became irrelevant. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 967. 
The resistance would traditionally indicate that the perpetrator understood the lack of consent, which 
does not matter when evaluating the consent through a consent in fact analysis. Id. 
 23 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 967. The court emphasized that the mistake of fact defense does not align 
with Massachusetts’ rape jurisprudence because the reasonable belief of the defendant does not inform 
the factual inquiry as to whether the victim consented. Id. The mistake of fact defense is available in 
Massachusetts in cases where the evidence suggests that the victim did not have the capacity to con-
sent. Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 745. Sherman makes a mistake of fact defense also available to defendants 
in cases involving the withdrawal of consent after penetration. 116 N.E.3d at 605. 
 24 Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 745. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 744. 
 27 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 967 (listing Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, New Jersey, California, Texas, 
and Missouri as examples of the majority of jurisdictions that recognize mistake of fact with regard to 
consent generally); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1) (2016) (requiring that the actor knowingly 
penetrate the victim sexually to constitute rape); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2) (2017) (requiring a 
“culpable mental state,” thus implicating a knowledge requirement); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 
1278 (N.J. 1992) (placing the defendant’s state of mind at issue when evaluating whether the defend-
ant reasonably believed the victim gave affirmative permission); Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621, 625 
(Alaska 1983) (explaining that the state must prove the defendant acted recklessly with regard to con-
sent and providing protection for defendants where the conditions surrounding consent are ambigu-
ous); People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1347 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the lower court’s refusal to 
give the jury mistake of fact instructions was reversible error). 
 28 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing efforts to emphasize the victim’s consent 
instead of the defendant’s understanding of the victim’s consent as rape jurisprudence reform). 
 29 See Matthew R. Lyon, No Means No: Withdrawal of Consent During Intercourse and the Con-
tinuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 291 (2004) (explain-
ing that the majority of states have not addressed withdrawn consent); Foreman, supra note 13 (ex-
plaining the outcry before and throughout the #MeToo movement for better recourse for sexual vio-
lence). 
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the possibility for the defense to be available in unique rape scenarios.30 The 
SJC addressed this possibility in 2008 in Blache, allowing the mistake of fact 
defense for defendants when the victim is incapable of consenting due to in-
toxication.31 The opening identified in Lopez was necessary for the court’s 
holding in Commonwealth v. Sherman, which addressed a jury question regard-
ing the withdrawal of consent after the sexual intercourse began.32 The Com-
monwealth already empowered victims who withdrew consent with the ability 
to seek recourse for sexual trauma resulting from an encounter where the vic-
tim initially consented and then revoked consent during intercourse.33 Before 
the decision in Sherman, Massachusetts courts instructed juries to evaluate 
cases where the evidence presented an issue of withdrawn consent in the same 
manner as in a rape case without withdrawn consent.34 After Sherman, to es-
tablish postpenetration rape, the prosecution must prove that the victim com-
municated the withdrawn consent such that a reasonable person would under-
stand.35 Although this new element reintroduced the mistake of fact defense in 
Massachusetts’ rape jurisprudence, the court continued to only apply the mis-
take of fact defense narrowly in rape cases.36 
B. Sherman’s Factual and Procedural History 
The SJC further enhanced its jurisprudence on rape cases involving with-
drawn consent in Sherman.37 The victim and defendant, Richard Sherman, met 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 969. 
 31 Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 744. The court identified a circumstance where the mistake of fact de-
fense is available to defendants in Commonwealth v. Blache. See id. (explaining that although Massa-
chusetts does not usually allow the mistake of fact defense in rape cases, where the victim does not 
have the capacity to consent, the court should require the prosecution to prove the defendant knew of 
the victim’s incapacity). This analysis came after the court established that the prosecution must also 
show that the complainant was so intoxicated that she was “wholly insensible” and thus could not 
consent. Id. at 740. After proving intoxication to this extent, the prosecution must then only prove the 
amount of force necessary for penetration. Id. 
 32 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 604; see infra note 47 (discussing details of the jury question); see also 
Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 969 (noting that the court may consider the mistake of fact defense in some 
circumstances); supra note 31 and accompanying text (providing an example of a circumstance where 
the mistake of fact defense applies). 
 33 Enimpah, 966 N.E.2d at 843–844. 
 34 See Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (explaining the need for clarifying the line between consensu-
al sex and postpenetration rape). 
 35 Id. at 606. 
 36 Id.; see Lyon, supra note 29, at 280 (explaining that progressive rape jurisprudence emphasizes 
consent). This Comment defines progressive rape jurisprudence to mean jurisprudence that prioritizes 
the victim’s nonconsent rather than the defendant’s force or state of mind. See Lyon, supra note 29, at 
280. Massachusetts maintained its progressive position by limiting the mistake of fact defense to a 
narrow application. See Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 967 (noting the incompatibility of the mistake of fact 
defense with the Commonwealth’s rape jurisprudence). 
 37 See Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (adding a new element for the prosecution to prove, namely, 
that the victim communicated the withdrawal of consent such that a reasonable person would have 
II.-328 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
on October 13, 2014 at a pub through a mutual acquaintance.38 The defendant 
and victim did not know each other prior to that night.39 When the defendant 
asked the victim to “hang out” after the pub closed, the victim accepted.40 
Throughout their conversations the victim reiterated that she identified as ho-
mosexual in response to the defendant’s implicit desire to engage in sex.41 The 
parties exchanged text messages and eventually agreed for the victim to meet 
the defendant at his home shortly before 2:00 A.M.42 After arriving at his 
home, the parties’ testimonies drastically diverged.43 The defendant asserted 
that he and the victim engaged in consensual sex and the victim testified that 
she never gave consent to any sexual contact and suffered violent sexual trau-
ma.44 
                                                                                                                           
understood the sexual intercourse was no longer consensual). The new element paralleled decisions 
from other state supreme courts. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (Cal. 2003) (noting that a vic-
tim’s expression of objection during initially consensual intercourse combined with the defendant’s 
forced continuation disregarding the objection constitutes forcible rape). In re John Z. overruled Peo-
ple v. Vela, which held that the trial court prejudiced the defendant by answering a jury question ask-
ing whether continued penetration after the victim withdraws consent constitutes rape affirmatively 
rather than in the negative. In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 186; People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 
1985); see also State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Me. 1985) (affirming a conviction under the 
trial judge’s instruction that deemed compelled sexual intercourse after one party communicated its 
revocation of consent as rape). 
 38 Sherman, N.E.3d at 599. Both parties consumed alcohol, but the capacity to consent was not at 
issue. See id. at 599, 602 (noting the victim consumed two drinks at the pub, where she met the de-
fendant, and the defendant consumed up to four and a half beers throughout the night). 
 39 Id. at 599. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 599–600. The victim reminded the defendant of her homosexuality after he asked her to 
get condoms. Id. 
 42 Id. at 600. The victim again reiterated that she did not wish to engage in a sexual relationship 
with the defendant by informing him she was on her period in the text messages. Id. 
 43 Id. at 599, 600–02. 
 44 Brief for Defendant at 2, Sherman, 116 N.E.3d 597 (No. SJC-12530). The victim testified that 
after arriving at the defendant’s apartment, the defendant invited her to his bedroom to show her a 
music record. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 600. After sitting on the foot of the defendant’s bed to look at 
the record, the defendant sat behind the victim and tried to kiss her cheek. Id. The victim testified to 
rejecting this contact by “putting her hand” out and reiterating that she identified as gay. Id. The de-
fendant tried to kiss the victim again and “[b]efore she could tell him to stop, the defendant got on top 
of the victim, put his knees on her thighs and put his hands on her shoulders.” Id. According to the 
victim’s testimony, she continued to protest the defendant’s sexual advances by saying “stop” and 
“get the fuck off me.” Id. The victim testified that despite these protests, the defendant then proceeded 
to vaginally rape her, insert his penis in her mouth, digitally rape her, and then vaginally rape her a 
second time. Id. At no point did the victim testify to consensual sexual contact. Id. at 607. 
 Conversely, the defendant testified to consensual sex. Id. The defendant testified that upon the 
victim’s arrival at his apartment, he kissed her cheek and invited her inside. Id. at 601. The defendant 
testified to kissing the victim on the lips for several minutes with the victim’s reciprocation. Id. He 
then testified that the victim entered the defendant’s bedroom with him following. Id. at 602. The 
defendant explained that they continued kissing on the edge of his bed and engaged in “touching each 
other’s genitals.” Id. The defendant then testified to receiving consensual oral sex from the victim 
before she removed her clothes and laid in the bed, at which point she asked him to “put it in her” 
before they proceeded to have consensual vaginal sex. Id. 
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A grand jury indicted Richard Sherman on three counts of rape on De-
cember 11, 2014.45 At the subsequent trial, the jury convicted him of penile-
vaginal and digital-vaginal rape and acquitted him on the third charge of oral 
rape.46 The defendant appealed, alleging that the judge erred by failing to pro-
vide a jury instruction requiring the prosecution to prove that the victim com-
municated her withdrawn consent such that a reasonable person would under-
stand that consent was withdrawn.47 
After hearing the evidence, the judge provided the jury with instructions 
on the rape indictments.48 While deliberating, the jury submitted a question to 
the judge concerning postpenetration withdrawn consent.49 The trial judge an-
swered the question affirmatively, explaining that lawful sex may become un-
lawful as long as the prosecution proved both lack of consent and force.50 On 
appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial judge committed reversible error by 
failing to instruct the jury that the victim must communicate the withdrawn 
consent.51 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Brief for Commonwealth at 1–2, Sherman, 116 N.E.3d 597 (No. SJC-12530). 
 46 Brief for Defendant, supra note 44, at 1. The SJC noted the possibility that the jury’s acquittal 
of the oral rape charge meant the fact finders accepted the defendant’s testimony that the oral inter-
course was consensual. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 607. 
 47 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 599. The issue of how the court will consider postpenetration rape 
arose when the jury submitted a written question to the judge asking whether sexual intercourse that 
begins consensually but where a party changes his or her mind during the duration of the sexual act is 
rape. Id. at 603. The issue of postpenetration withdrawn consent arose for the first time in response to 
a jury question addressing withdrawn consent after initial consensual penetration. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 
at 162 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the trial court was incorrect in its affirmative instruction to the 
jury after the jury asked whether forced sex after withdrawn consent constitutes rape), overruled by In 
re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184; Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270–71 (Md. 1980) (remanding for a new 
trial after determining that the trial judge incorrectly answered the jury’s question regarding whether 
consensual sex can become nonconsensual because consent prior to penetration is the determining 
factor when evaluating whether a rape occurred). 
 Because the defendant did not object to the instruction at trial, the court must consider whether 
the judge’s instruction “created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.” Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 
603; see Commonwealth v. Pires 899 N.E.2d 787, 793 (Mass. 2009) (explaining the required judicial 
review when the defendant does not object to a jury question). 
 48 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d 597, 602; see infra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the in-
struction). 
 49 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 603. The jury’s question was the following: “[I]s it rape if it started 
consensual and she changed her mind?” Id. 
 50 Id. The instruction included the following language: “Lawful sexual intercourse can become 
unlawful sexual intercourse, but remember that the Commonwealth has to prove . . . both portions of 
the second element: lack of consent and use of force or constructive force.” Id. During the trial, nei-
ther the prosecution nor the defense objected to the instruction. Id. 
 51 Id. The defendant’s claim of reversible error asserted that the judge’s failure impacted the 
case’s outcome, thus creating grounds for reversal had the defendant objected to the failure at trial. 
Error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6. The SJC heard the defendant’s case after the de-
fendant applied for direct appellate review. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 603. In Massachusetts, where the 
Appeals Court already docketed a party’s appeal and a party applied for direct appellate review, the 
SJC may grant the application and hear the case instead of the Appeals Court. Direct Appellate Re-
II.-330 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
The appeal of the instruction required the SJC to evaluate for the first 
time whether an additional element proving the victim communicated his or 
her withdrawn consent was necessary for a rape conviction.52 Although Massa-
chusetts already recognized that consensual sex may become unlawful when 
the victim revokes consent postpenetration, jury instructions to this effect are 
rarely provided.53 In Sherman, the SJC sought to impose a “clear line” distin-
guishing consensual intercourse from postpenetration rape.54 This line required 
the prosecution to prove that the victim communicated his or her revoked con-
sent such that a reasonable person would have understood the consent was 
withdrawn.55 After satisfying this communication element, the prosecution 
does not need to prove an additional force element because compelling contin-
ued intercourse after withdrawn consent is sufficient.56 
In Sherman, because the victim testified to entirely nonconsensual inter-
course and the defendant testified to entirely consensual intercourse, there was 
no evidence presented at trial that the victim withdrew consent postpenetra-
                                                                                                                           
view, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/direct-appellate-review [https://perma.cc/9GC8-
R4QG]. 
 52 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 604 (noting that a requirement that the victim communicate withdrawn 
consent). The court in Sherman also examined its mistake of fact jurisprudence in other rape cases. Id. 
Massachusetts does not allow a defendant to argue that he or she mistakenly interpreted the victim’s 
consent because the “mistake of fact defense would tend to eviscerate the long-standing rule in this 
Commonwealth that victims need not use any force to resist an attack.” Lopez, 745 N.E.2d at 967. 
Conversely, in cases where the victim’s capacity to consent is at issue, Massachusetts allows for a 
mistake of fact defense. Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 736, 745. Because satisfaction of the force element 
when a victim lacks the capacity to consent is reduced to the force necessary for penetration, the pros-
ecution has to meet a higher standard of proof for the consent element. See id. at 741–42 (describing 
how imposing a subjective element for consent balances the lower threshold required to prove force 
when the victim cannot consent due to incapacity). Consequently, the SJC imposed a subjective 
standard in Blache, requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant “knew or reasonably should 
have known” that the victim was incapable of consenting to sexual contact. Id. at 745 n.17.  
 53 See Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (emphasizing the court’s recognition of postpenetration rape); 
M.G. v. G.A., 112 N.E.3d 837, 843 (Mass. 2018) (noting the ability to withdraw consent prior to or 
during a sexual act); Enimpah, 966 N.E.2d at 844 (explaining that a defendant may be found guilty of 
rape in cases where initial penetration was consensual, but the defendant continued intercourse after 
the victim revoked consent). The SJC envisioned that these withdrawn consent instructions would 
rarely apply. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 606. Their instructions only apply when the evidence at trial 
demonstrates that the victim consented initially and then revoked consent or when the jury submits a 
question to the court about withdrawn consent. Id. 
 54 Sherman, 116 N.E.2d at 607. 
 55 Id. The court emphasized that a victim does not need to use physical force or even words to 
communicate his or her withdrawn consent. Id. at 606. For example, attempting to push away the 
defendant or moving in a way to make penetration difficult can serve to convey the revocation of 
consent. Id. Critics argue that an element requiring the communication of revoked consent does not 
offer clarity unless the courts also define a reasonable time in which the defendant must respond to the 
withdrawn consent. Lyon, supra note 29, at 308. Courts regularly use a reasonableness standard with-
out explaining specifics of time considerations to a jury. Id. 
 56 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 606. 
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tion.57 Consequently, a jury instruction imposing the burden on the prosecution 
to prove the communication of withdrawn consent was not necessary for the 
jury to evaluate the facts.58 The SJC determined that the jury would still have 
convicted the defendant if the judge provided the revised instructions.59 Thus, 
the SJC upheld the defendant’s convictions.60 Although the SJC’s decision did 
not impact the outcome of the case in Sherman, the court’s affirmation of its 
recognition of postpenetration rape was significant.61 The acknowledgment of 
postpenetration rape combined with the court’s clarification of the prosecu-
tion’s burden of proof in postpenetration rape cases, arguably preserved the 
victims’ right to claim withdrawn consent and opened the door for defendants 
to assert a new mistake of fact defense.62 
II. MASSACHUSETTS’ COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENT PAVED  
THE WAY FOR RECOGNIZING POSTPENETRATION RAPE 
In 2019, in Commonwealth v. Sherman, the SJC added a new element of 
proof the prosecution must meet to establish that a postpenetration rape oc-
curred.63 In doing so, the SJC reiterated that postpenetration rape constitutes a 
criminal offense in Massachusetts.64 Only seven states have explicitly crimi-
nalized postpenetration rape through their courts.65 Although the facts in 
Sherman did not allow for the SJC to hold that a postpenetration rape occurred, 
the new element requiring communication of withdrawn consent enhanced the 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. at 607. 
 58 Id. (explaining that without evidence that the victim initially consented and then withdrew her 
consent, the absence of the element requiring the communication of withdrawn consent did not influ-
ence the jury’s decision). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 609. On a second issue regarding admission of evidence related to the defendant’s co-
caine use, the court concluded that no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred. Id. at 608. 
 61 See id. at 606 (requiring proof of a communication of withdrawn consent). The new communi-
cation requirement inherently recognizes the ability to withdraw consent. See id. (suggesting where 
the victim can prove communication of withdrawn consent, they can successfully allege postpenetra-
tion rape). 
 62 See generally id. (allowing a mistake of fact defense where the victim has withdrawn consent 
by imposing a requirement that the victim communicate withdrawn consent). 
 63 See Commonwealth v. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d 597, 605 (Mass. 2019) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Enimpah, 966 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)) (noting that a defendant could be guilty of rape 
after forcibly continuing sex despite withdrawn consent). 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Parker, supra note 3, at 1068 n.13 (noting other courts seem to agree on the validity of 
postpenetration rape without explicitly holding postpenetration rape can occur). Illinois remains the 
only state to criminalize postpenetration rape statutorily. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-170(c) (2012); 
Parker, supra note 3, at 1068. 
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Commonwealth’s jurisprudence so a victim can more confidently seek re-
course for a rape in which he or she initially consented.66 
Section A of this Part uses North Carolina as an example of antiquated rape 
law.67 Section B of this Part situates Massachusetts among the minority of states 
that recognizes postpenetration rape by comparing Massachusetts to Maine.68 
A. North Carolina Fails to Recognize Revoked Consent 
North Carolina’s jurisprudence regarding withdrawn consent epitomizes 
the view that Massachusetts and trending conversations about rape seek to 
leave behind.69 Legislation recognizing the ability of participants to rescind 
consent during sex has repeatedly failed to pass in North Carolina.70 The con-
versation surrounding these legislative failures helps to identify North Caroli-
na’s attitude towards withdrawn consent.71 The discourse identifies the signifi-
                                                                                                                           
 66 See generally Sherman, 116 N.E.3d 597 (explaining how neither the state nor the defendant 
presented evidence suggesting withdrawn consent and instilling confidence in victims by institutional-
izing how their communication of revoked consent creates a line between consensual sex and rape). 
 67 See infra notes 69–80 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 81–93 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Sarah Delia, Revoking Consent Bill Dies Again in N.C., WFAE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://
www.wfae.org/post/revoking-consent-bill-dies-again-nc#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/UCE7-K9WQ]; 
AJ Willingham, North Carolina’s the Only State with a Law That Says Once a Sexual Act Begins, You 
Can’t Withdraw Consent, CNN, (June 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/02/health/north-
carolina-rape-consent-bill-563-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/829F-REDN] (noting that North 
Carolina remains the only state that explicitly does not allow revoked consent, whereas other states 
have not explicitly addressed this issue); see also State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C. 1979) 
(requiring proof of consent only for initial penetration); Parker, supra note 3, at 1068 (explaining that 
victims of postpenetration rape in North Carolina do not have any recourse available). The view re-
form efforts seek to leave behind is the misallocated emphasis on the defendant’s understanding of 
consent instead of whether the victim consented in fact. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 Maryland overcame its shared position with North Carolina when the Maryland Supreme Court 
overturned Battle v. State in 2008. State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 472 (Md. 2008). See generally Battle 
v. State, 414 A.2d 1266 (Md. 1980) (explaining that only initial penetration requires consent). The 
court in Battle noted that consent is only revocable before initial penetration. Battle, 414 A.2d at 1270. 
In 2008, the Maryland Supreme Court in State v. Baby identified its emphasis on consent prior to 
penetration as dicta and held that jury instructions on the withdrawal of consent after penetration 
should apply. 946 A.2d at 472. 
 70 Delia, supra note 69. In 1979, in State v. Way, North Carolina’s Supreme Court held that con-
sent was only required for the initial penetration. 254 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C. 1979). The holding in 
Way thus requires legislative action to acknowledge and provide recourse for victims of postpenetra-
tion rape. Delia, supra note 69. Reformers must call for legislative action to acknowledge and provide 
recourse for victims of postpenetration rape. Id. 
 71 See Janet Burns, North Carolina May Finally Let Women Revoke Consent During Sex, FORBES 
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2019/04/22/north-carolina-may-finally-let-
women-revoke-consent-during-sex/#204391c32d2e [https://perma.cc/3DEE-BRZS] (describing the 
ability for perpetrators to have rape charges against them dismissed because the victim initially con-
sented as a loophole); Molly Redden, ‘No Doesn’t Really Mean No’: North Carolina Law Means 
Women Can’t Revoke Consent for Sex, THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2017/jun/24/north-carolina-rape-legal-loophole-consent-state-v-way [https://perma.cc/E7XJ-
2020] Recognizing Postpenetration Rape Through the Mistake of Fact Defense II.-333 
cant ramifications of refusing to recognize the revocation of consent by refer-
ring to the state’s failure to recognize rape in cases of withdrawn consent as a 
loophole.72 
The loophole originated in 1979, when the North Carolina Supreme Court 
affirmatively limited withdrawn consent to apply only in between sexual en-
counters.73 If the perpetrator received consent for the initial penetration, then 
he or she did not commit rape.74 This approach construed the nature of sex to 
only include one act of penetration.75 
                                                                                                                           
FM7K] (explaining how the Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Way distressed victims and prosecu-
tors). 
 72 See Erik Ortiz, ‘It’s Disgusting’: Loopholes Remain in North Carolina’s Sexual Assault Laws. 
Advocates Ask Why., NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/it-s-dis-
gusting-loopholes-remain-north-carolina-s-sexual-assault-n1004436 [https://perma.cc/4Y9F-TVVE] 
(identifying the victim’s lack of recourse for her alleged rape after she revoked consent as a loophole); 
Willingham, supra note 69 (referring to legislation elucidating the definition of consent as having 
potential to close the “legal loophole”). This loophole refers to a defendant’s ability to secure dismis-
sal of their rape charges, even in cases with facts demonstrating the victim withdrew consent after the 
penetration commenced. See Burns, supra note 71 (explaining how victims in North Carolina do not 
have recourse for rape where the victim initially consented and subsequently withdrew consent after 
penetration). 
 73 See Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761 (granting the defendant a new trial after holding that the trial 
court’s instruction affirming the ability to withdraw consent was erroneous). According to Way, par-
ties only have the ability to withdraw consent before or after a sexual encounter. Id. In Way, the victim 
testified that after closing the bedroom door, the defendant began to beat her and threaten her verbally 
before forcing her on to the bed and compelling her to have anal, oral, and vaginal intercourse. Id. at 
760. The defendant’s testimony introduced withdrawn consent by introducing facts that the victim 
exclaimed about stomach pains, thus revoking consent, such that the defendant sought assistance from 
a female friend. Id. at 761. 
 After a question from the jury asking if consent can be withdrawn, the judge instructed the jury 
that “consent initially given could be withdrawn and if the intercourse continued through use of force 
or threat of force and that the act at that point was no longer consensual this would constitute the 
crime of rape.” Id. The jury found the defendant guilty of second degree rape. Id. 
 74 Id. at 762. The court in Way appeared to recognize the poor taste of this outcome, leaving open 
the possibility that the perpetrator who does not stop engaging in sexual intercourse after a party re-
vokes consent may have committed another crime. See id. (“[A]lthough he may be guilty of another 
crime because of his subsequent actions.”). 
 75 Compare Enimpah, 966 N.E.2d at 843 (explaining how even slight penetration is sufficient to 
establish intercourse and that penetration includes not only initial penetration, but also subsequent 
penetration and intercourse thereafter), and State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1985) (cri-
tiquing North Carolina’s analysis that the victim’s consent only matters upon initial penetration), with 
Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761 (explaining that withdrawal of consent only occurs between sexual encoun-
ters). 
 The Supreme Court of Maine went as far as suggesting that the logic in Way defies common 
sense by theoretically allowing a victim whose struggles caused the disengagement of the male organ 
to qualify for rape, but not recognizing a victim for whom withdrawal of the male organ was not pos-
sible. See Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070–71 (critiquing Way as erroneous and instead relying on com-
mon sense to interpret the situation). 
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The Massachusetts Appeals Court recognized the weakness of North Car-
olina’s interpretation, in 2012, in Commonwealth v. Enimpah.76 The trial judge 
in Enimpah instructed that even slight initial penetration satisfies the element 
requiring the state to prove intercourse.77 The court emphasized that this in-
struction does not limit penetration’s definition to only initial penetration.78 By 
allowing for the time of penetration to include any time during sexual inter-
course, the court implicitly interpreted the Commonwealth’s rape statute to 
include cases in which a party revokes consent.79 The court cited similar inter-
pretations from other states, including Alaska, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine and 
Maryland, pointedly leaving North Carolina alone as the representative of an-
tiquated rape jurisprudence.80 
B. Comparing Massachusetts’ Recognition of Withdrawn Consent to Maine 
Prior to Sherman, the Commonwealth recognized the existence of postpen-
etration rape but had not affirmatively required the communication element.81 
The new element requiring the victim to reasonably communicate the revocation 
of his or her consent aligned Massachusetts’ jurisprudence with Maine.82 
The courts in Maine and Massachusetts evaluated the force and consent 
elements of rape slightly differently.83 In 1985, in State v. Robinson, Maine 
became the first state to recognize rape after withdrawn consent.84 In response 
                                                                                                                           
 76 966 N.E.2d at 843 (contrasting its understanding of consent and other states’ interpretation to 
that of Way, 254 S.E.2d at 760). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. at 843–44 (explaining that the rape elements cannot reasonably be interpreted to ex-
clude cases in which the victim withdrew consent after initial penetration, but the perpetrator contin-
ued with force). 
 80 See id. at 843 (citing Baby, 946 A.2d at 486); State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 28 (Kan. 2006); 
Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069; McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Siering, 
644 A.2d 958, 962 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) and contrasting Way, 254 S.E.2d at 762). 
 81 Id. at 843–44 (recognizing postpenetration rape hypothetically, but not explicitly affirming a 
postpenetration rape conviction); see Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (noting the need for a clear line to 
identify when consensual sex becomes postpenetration rape as a reason for imposing the communica-
tion requirement). 
 82 See Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069 (requiring the communication of withdrawn consent); see also 
In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185 (Cal. 2003) (requiring the victim to express his or her objection). Alas-
ka’s jurisprudence represents another approach to withdrawn consent, which parallels Massachusetts’ 
methodology prior to Sherman. Compare McGill, 18 P.3d at 82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (upholding a 
jury instruction that consent to sex is revocable and may constitute rape as long as the state proves all 
elements), with Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that if the jury 
finds the state proved the force element, then that is the “equivalent” to proving that the victim ex-
pressed the revocation of his or her consent). 
 83 See infra note 86 and accompanying text (describing how Maine emphasizes force more than 
Massachusetts, which emphasizes communication of withdrawn consent). 
 84 Lyon, supra note 29, at 296; see Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1071 (affirming a trial judge’s answer 
to a question submitted by the jury). 
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to a jury question, the trial judge instructed the jury that rape includes circum-
stances in which one party communicates that he or she revoked consent and 
the other party disregards this communication and compels the sexual inter-
course to continue.85 Although this instruction parallels the new element re-
quired by Sherman, Maine’s trial judge and the appellate court emphasized a 
different element in their analysis.86 The analysis in Robinson emphasized that 
the defendant must continue the sexual intercourse by means of compulsion 
after the withdrawal of consent.87 By focusing on the force element, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine ensured that the state must prove at least the 
same level of force as required for rape in which the victim never consented.88 
Meanwhile, in 2019, in Sherman, the SJC weakened the trial judge’s reit-
eration of the force element.89 After addressing the new element requiring the 
victim to communicate his or her withdrawn consent, the court noted that only 
the force “necessary to compel continued intercourse” after the revocation of 
consent satisfies the force element.90 Although this instruction reads similarly 
to the instructions in Robinson, the court in Sherman explained that the prose-
cution did not need to prove any further threat or use of force in cases of with-
drawn consent.91 Moreover, although Maine appears to require the state to 
prove force to the same extent as it would in cases of entirely nonconsensual 
sex, Massachusetts leaves open the potential for a successful argument that 
continuing intercourse after the victim clearly communicated his or her with-
drawn consent inherently satisfies the criteria of compelling continued sexual 
intercourse.92 The SJC’s analysis aligned with the SJC’s logic in Common-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069 (noting the jury’s question concerned whether the continuation of 
sex after one party withdraws consent constitutes rape). 
 86 Compare id. at 1070 (“[t]he critical element there is the continuation under compulsion”), with 
Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605 (discussing at length the need for a reasonable mistake of fact defense in 
cases involving withdrawn consent, but not addressing whether the prosecution needed to prove addi-
tional force after the revoked consent). 
 87 Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070. In Maine, compulsion means include physical force, threat of 
force, or both, resulting in the victim becoming unable to resist the perpetrator or fearing reasonably 
serious bodily injury or death. Id. at 1069 n.1. 
 88 See id. at 1069 (repeating the instructions for what amount of force is necessary for a rape con-
viction).  
 89 Compare Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 603, 606 (instructing the jury on the force element in re-
sponse to the jury’s question about withdrawn consent), with Robinson 496 A.2d at 1070 (emphasiz-
ing that the state must prove not just nonconsent, but also that the penetration continued as a result of 
compulsion). 
 90 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 606. 
 91 Id.; see also Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070 (emphasizing force in the instruction to the jury); 
What Does “Yes” Mean?, supra note 1, at 2362 (“The vagueness of the persistence element of post-
penetration rape illustrates the uneasiness with which it sits as a proxy for force.”). 
 92 See Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 606 (noting the rare circumstances in which the court will need to 
provide instructions on the revocation of consent); What Does “Yes” Mean?, supra note 1, at 2363 
(observing how recognizing withdrawn consent shifts the analysis from penetrative acts to acts after 
penetration and critiquing the risk of a victim alleging withdrawn consent so that he or she only must 
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wealth v. Blache, which invoked the mistake of fact defense to balance the de-
fendant’s interests with the prosecution’s lower proof requirement for the force 
element.93 
III. IDENTIFYING A MIDDLE GROUND THROUGH  
THE MISTAKE OF FACT DEFENSE 
In Commonwealth v. Sherman, the SJC positioned the Commonwealth in 
the progressive minority of jurisdictions that recognize postpenetration rape.94 
In doing so, the SJC held that the prosecution must prove a new element—that 
the victim reasonably communicated the revocation of consent—making the 
mistake of fact defense available to defendants.95 Victim advocates traditional-
ly critique the mistake of fact defense for its disregard of the victim’s noncon-
sent.96 Nevertheless, invoking the mistake of fact defense does not diminish 
Massachusetts’ progress in rape jurisprudence because the circumstances 
where it applies remain narrow.97 
The SJC in Sherman offered reasoning that paralleled its analysis in 2008 
in Commonwealth v. Blache, limiting the expansion of the mistake of fact de-
fense. 98 In 2008, in Blache, the SJC held that in cases where the victim was 
incapable of consenting due to intoxication, a defendant may assert a mistake 
                                                                                                                           
prove persistence rather than force). California also appeared to leave open the possibility that contin-
ued intercourse after withdrawn consent sufficiently satisfies the force element. See In re John Z., 60 
P.3d at 187 (emphasizing that no statutory language or case law support the defendant’s argument that 
perpetrators are entitled to continue sex after the withdrawal of consent). 
 93 Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 744–45 (noting the prosecution only needed to prove the amount of 
force necessary for penetration to meet the force element, thus necessitating a mistake of fact defense 
available to the defendant to mitigate potential injustice). 
 94 See Commonwealth v. Sherman, 116 N.E.3d 597, 605 (Mass. 2019) (identifying the need to 
differentiate consensual sex from postpenetration rape); Lyon, supra note 29, at 285–86 (noting re-
formers’ increased emphasis on the victim’s evidence regarding his or her consent or lack thereof); 
see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining how reformers envision rape jurisprudence 
emphasizing whether the victim in fact consented as opposed to what the defendant understood). 
 95 Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605–06. 
 96 See Lyon, supra note 29, at 285–86 (explaining how a reliance on resistance to define noncon-
sent worked against victims as opposed to a legal definition that emphasized the victim’s testimony 
about consent). 
 97 See Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 604, 605 (citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. 
2001), to explain the incompatibility of mistake of fact defense in the Commonwealth’s general rape 
jurisprudence). In 2001, in Lopez, the SJC upheld the rape and indecent assault convictions of the 
defendant. 745 N.E.2d at 962. The defendant claimed the trial court’s failure to provide an instruction 
on mistake of fact constituted error. Id. at 964. The SJC affirmed that the defendant was not entitled to 
the mistake of fact defense. Id. 
 98 Compare Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 606 (explaining that the communication requirement protects 
defendants), with Commonwealth v. Blache, 880 N.E.2d 736, 745 (Mass. 2008) (noting the mistake of 
fact defense is necessary due to the lower force requirement). 
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of fact defense.99 The court reasoned that proof of the victim’s incapacity to 
consent lowered the threshold needed for the prosecution to prove the force 
element to only requiring the force necessary for penetration.100 Accordingly, 
the court recognized that lowering the requirements to prove force risked injus-
tice, unless the defendant had the opportunity to present evidence of his or her 
reasonable mistake about the victim’s capacity to consent.101 This reasoning 
protected the defendant by balancing the proof requirements such that the scale 
did not tip in favor of the prosecution: when the required proof for the force 
element of the crime decreased, the consent element required more.102 
In 2019, in Sherman, the SJC employed the same balancing analysis as in 
Blache to determine that a mistake of fact defense should be available to defend-
ants in cases of postpenetration rape.103 The court noted that unlike in typical 
rape cases, where the proof of force precludes any possibility of mistake, prov-
ing force during continued penetration posed a more difficult evaluation pro-
cess.104 Citing principles of fairness and clarity, the SJC imposed a requirement 
that the victim reasonably convey his or her revocation of consent.105 
Thus, the SJC held that the requirement of the communication of with-
drawn consent introduces the mistake of fact defense.106 Specifically, the de-
fendant may argue that the communication was not in a manner such that a 
                                                                                                                           
 99 880 N.E.2d at 741–42. The SJC relied on premises outlined by the SJC in 1870 in Common-
wealth v. Burke, emphasizing the implicit premise that the prosecution must also prove the defend-
ant’s knowledge of the victim’s incapacity when the prosecution uses proof that intoxication rendered 
the victim unable to consent. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 380 (1870)). 
 In Blache, the defendant was convicted of rape by a jury in the Superior Court. Id. at 738. The 
intermediate court upheld the conviction. Id. On August 17, 2000, the victim went to a bar after smok-
ing marijuana and taking antianxiety medication. Id. The victim drank substantially throughout her 
visits to two bars. Id. The defendant joined the victim around 11:30 p.m. Id. When the group departed 
from the bar, the victim was intoxicated such that she struggled walking and stumbled twice. Id. After 
an altercation at a friend’s house, where the police were dispatched to address the victim’s belliger-
ence, the victim and defendant’s testimonies diverged. Id. at 739. 
 The victim testified that the defendant drove her home from the friend’s house and stopped by a 
dumpster, where he vaginally raped her despite her physical and verbal protests. Id. Conversely, the 
defendant testified that he and the victim had consensual intercourse after he drove her home. Id. 
 100 Id. at 744 (noting the prosecution could satisfy the force element by only proving penetration). 
 101 Id. at 744–45. 
 102 See id. The court in Blache was careful to note, however, that this defense is only available in 
a narrow class of rape cases where the prosecution need not prove force. Id. at 744 (citing Lopez, 745 
N.E.2d 961, which rationalized that the force element negated any mistake as to consent because 
compulsion sufficiently showed the defendant’s culpability). 
 103 See Sherman, 116 N.E.3d at 605. 
 104 Id. (“[I]t is far easier to evaluate whether force or the threat of force compelled a victim to 
submit to a defendant’s initial penetration of a victim’s vagina, anus, or mouth than it is to evaluate 
whether force or the threat of force compelled a victim to submit to a defendant’s continued penetra-
tion.”). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 606. 
II.-338 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
reasonable person would have understood the consent was revoked.107 The ob-
jective nature of this standard differentiates Sherman from Blache because un-
der Sherman, a jury must only consider the state of mind of a reasonable de-
fendant, rather than the defendant’s subjective knowledge as required by 
Blache.108 Consequently, the communication inquiry required by Sherman 
does not go beyond Blache, but offers a narrower defense that similarly bal-
ances the burdens of proof to secure the defendant from injustice.109 
The narrower nature of the mistake of fact defense in Sherman, estab-
lished through reasoning logically consistent with Blache, served to retain the 
Commonwealth’s leadership in rape jurisprudence.110 Although the SJC made 
the mistake of fact defense available in another circumstance of rape cases, the 
analysis did not risk applying the mistake of fact defense in rape jurisprudence 
generally.111 The shared reasoning in Sherman and Blache implies that a mis-
take of fact defense only applies when the risk for injustice necessitates re-
balancing the burdens faced by the prosecution and defense, respectively.112 
The SJC’s analysis identified a middle ground in Massachusetts’ rape ju-
risprudence by making a mistake of fact defense available without diminishing 
the courts’ desire not to allow for the defense more generally.113 The communi-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. 
 108 Compare id. (allowing for an inquiry into a reasonable defendant’s state of mind), with 
Blache, 880 N.E.2d at 741–42 (allowing the defendant to argue that he did not subjectively know the 
victim did not have the capacity to consent). The reasonableness standard is sufficient to assess the 
communication of withdrawn consent without the SJC supplying further description for what consti-
tutes a reasonable defendant. See Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake 
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cation element manifests a way for rape jurisprudence to serve victims and 
defendants, demanding the prosecution find clarity in a fact pattern susceptible 
to uncertainty while also maintaining a focus on the victim’s nonconsent in-
stead of the defendant’s state of mind.114 
CONCLUSION 
The nationwide conversation about consent and rape has brought the nu-
ances of consent to the forefront of rape jurisprudence. As this discourse con-
tinues in the media, juries will likely continue to question instructions provided 
to them, forcing jurisdictions to choose between aligning with the states that 
recognize postpenetration rape or those that do not. By imposing a clear line 
separating consensual sex from postpenetration rape, while also making a mis-
take of fact defense available to defendants, Massachusetts has set an example 
of a balanced approach that more states should follow. By balancing the ele-
ments required to prove rape to fit the realities of the circumstances, Massa-
chusetts simultaneously protects the victim while also acknowledging the nu-
ances of consent. 
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